

once thought to be harbingers of Arab democracy, have fallen into the “trap of liberalizing autocracy,” it has become increasingly difficult to envision how real democracy will ever actually come about in the region. To their credit, Brumberg and Vickie Langohr see a major role for the United States in using foreign aid to pressure intransigent Arab regimes to move forward with real reforms. Unfortunately, however, no essay in this collection analyzes in any great depth how American foreign policy has and continues to affect, often negatively, the process of democratization in the Middle East.

Although it is clear that the authors have made an effort to be objective, they sometimes appear unable to hide their gut aversion to Islamists – the group, for better or worse, most likely to benefit from democratic openings. Brumberg, in “Islamists and the Politics of Consensus,” asks: “Will Islamists share power with groups that espouse alternative notions of political community?” It is worth asking why there is always an *a priori* assumption that Islamists, even moderate, non-violent ones, are somehow innately more hostile to democracy than their secular counterparts, especially considering that most Arab dictatorships of the last five decades have been secular.

Despite the aforementioned concerns, the fact that this volume raises so many vital, urgent questions is a testament to the editors’ careful hand in guiding this project. Moreover, this book lends only more evidence that Brumberg – and his handprints are all over this volume – is quickly becoming the foremost scholar on democratization in the Middle East. Although far from perfect, *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* is one of the most comprehensive and informative surveys on the subject published thus far.

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Jihad: From Qur’an to Bin Laden

Richard Bonney

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Richard Bonney laments what he deems a misappropriation of the term *jihad* by both pundits in the West seeking to portray Islam as inherently violent, and a small faction of Muslim fanatics seeking political gain. Jihad, he contends, has been perverted from its original intent of encouraging spiritual athleticism and allowing for physical defense when transgression

occurs. He endeavors to return to the term's roots to detail how and why it has been manipulated over time to take on exclusively violent and aggressive connotations. By doing so, Bonney hopes to empower Muslim moderates to publicize the concept of jihad as purely defensive, as well as to enlighten non-Muslims of Islam's true message of peace, balance, and pluralism.

The author goes back to the original sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah, to make his case. He demonstrates his familiarity with the Qur'an by citing verses on jihad, contextualizing them in purely spiritual and defensive terms, and briefly mentions how they could be misinterpreted if one did not view the Qur'an holistically and in its proper context. However, Bonney betrays his ignorance of the Qur'anic sciences in his rather superficial description and application of classical hermeneutics and abrogation theory. Rather than engage the prolific tradition of Qur'anic exegesis, he relies on a few modern commentators (e.g., Qamaruddin Khan and Reuven Firestone) to promote his views. He acknowledges that these interpretations may differ with the tradition, but he does not address or attempt to resolve the tension between the two.

Bonney then moves on to the hadith literature, focusing almost exclusively on *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, as recorded in the online database of the University of Southern California's Muslim Students Association. From his study, he contends that jihad was used to represent all types of struggle, and that it was only by chance that the Prophet was forced to actualize his particular struggle through fighting and forming a political entity. Taken out of its historical circumstance, he says, one can easily use and misuse the Hadith texts to serve violent, politico-economic purposes.

After surveying the Qur'an and the Sunnah, Bonney takes a historical approach to the term and explains how the early caliphs, whom he claims were power-hungry to the core and based most of their actions on political designs, manipulated the previously peaceful notion of jihad to expand the empire through military conquest. Despite the ruling polity's excesses, however, the author says that one class retained both the letter and the spirit of the prophetic example: the Sufis, who continued to view jihad as calling only for self-sacrifice and spiritual struggle. In time, however, the author contends that even they were corrupted by such pseudo-Sufis as al-Ghazzali and, more egregiously, Shah Waliullah, who glorified jihad in its ultimate form as armed struggle. Thus, the views of the state and the ascetics began to converge, and jihad became an all-encompassing state principle.

The concept of jihad as a state principle was promoted by such thinkers as Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. As their thought spread, multiple revolutionary movements emerged throughout the Muslim world calling for jihad in order to achieve goals ranging from self-determination to eradicating un-Islamic practices. Bonney describes many of these movements and highlights their salient features, saying that they took on distinctly imperialist overtones, regardless of initial intentions or rhetoric. He then describes Sunni and Shi`i revivalist/jihadist groups of the twentieth century, all of which seemed to espouse the view that jihad is, first and foremost, aggressive and political. Although he does not go into detail, Bonney provides some insightful introductory material that gives a broad understanding of their scope and nature.

The author concludes his book by discussing the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and modern global jihadists in detail. He outlines this conflict's entire history, from the Balfour Declaration to the ongoing building of the security wall. This section is both descriptive and critical, and it allows the reader to trace the religious and political justifications for Palestinian modes of attack, including suicide bombings. Though he places the onus of reconciliation on Israel, Bonney effectively problematizes the situation and wisely declines to offer a solution. He gives Afghanistan and Kashmir similar treatment, so as to help the reader understand the causes for and motives behind those people whom he calls "global jihadists" (e.g., Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri). Bonney weaves the jihadist worldview, spiritual hierarchy, oil prices, and the American war machine into his discussion to once again provide a holistic view of the situation and at the same time problematize it. In this case, he ventures a partial solution in his conclusion.

Although he hopes that non-Muslims will achieve a certain level of tolerance by reading this book, Bonney directly addresses Muslims and says that the trend of misappropriating jihad for political purposes will not cease until Muslims themselves demand a return to Islam's original Qur'anic and prophetic principles. Islam, he insists, has no room for the notion of aggressive jihad, and Muslims should do their utmost to promote a tolerant view of Islam. This is indeed a very lofty claim to make; however, the book in question does not provide sufficient material to authoritatively make such a claim. The author's lack of familiarity with the Islamic sciences leads him to make hurried conclusions based on spurious evidence. In addition, it is clear that his thoughts are not derived from critical academic works, given that over one-third of his sources are from web pages. Conscience would drive us to appreciate his analysis of the current geopolitical situation, in addition

to revisiting the primary texts with a critical eye to ascertain whether his analysis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah has potential validity.

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Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

M. Hakan Yavuz

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During the events that led to the “soft coup” of the Erbakan-Çiller coalition government in 1997, the Turkish military declared that the number one threat to national security was not Kurdish separatism, but Islamic radicalism. Despite this shift in security strategy, the Justice and Development party, which was born from the ashes of Erbakan’s openly Islamist Refah party, won a decisive victory at the polls in November 2002. These series of events from Turkey’s recent history have raised many questions in the minds of observers, both international and domestic, as to the nature and strength of Islamic political and social movements in the Republic of Turkey – a state that since its birth in 1923 had undergone a systematic program of westernization and secularization.

In his *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, M. Hakan Yavuz attempts to answer these very questions by providing a comprehensive analysis of the main Muslim social groups that have come to dominate Turkish-Muslim society, namely, the Nakshibendi Sufi orders and the Nurcu movement. These groups have made significant inroads into Turkish civil society, crossing class, regional, and ethnic lines, by taking advantage of new opportunity spaces in the market, the print media, and education. This was a direct result of the political and economic liberalization policies of the Özal government during the 1980s.

As the author argues, “the secularizing, state-centric elite failed effectively to penetrate and transform traditional society, and was similarly unsuccessful in developing an alternative value system and associational life for the rural population of society” (p. 4). Thus, the social and ethical vacuum created by the Kemalists was appropriated by a diverse group of Islamic social movements that were then urbanized by way of the *gecekondu*s, the shanty-towns built overnight by rural migrants to the big cities during the 1960s and 1970s. These movements, which were silently germinating in the Anatolian countryside, underwent what Yavuz aptly terms the “vernacular-